Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Phillip C. Pepper v. Zions First National Bank : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Biele, Haslem & Hatch; Attorneys for Appellants.
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker; Gary R. Howe; Charles M. Bennett; Sheryl L. Simpson; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Pepper v. Zions First National Bank, No. 198620807.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1394

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KTU
45.0
* * * * * * *
.CD
3g>gP?
DOCKZTtJO:
PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an
)
Arizona resident, et al.,
)

14*

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

)
)

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
N.A., et al.,

)
)

C a s e No.

20807

vs.

District Court No. C-82-2779
Defendants,
Counterclaimants, and
Respondents0
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
N.A, , et al.,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
STEWART A. PEPPER, a Nevada
resident, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.

)
)
)

ON APPEAL FROM THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESI

TILED
JAN 151986

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

BIELE, HASLEM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
GARY R. HOWE (A1552)
CHARLES M. BENNETT (A0283)
SHERYL L. SIMPSON (A4670)
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorneys for Respondent
Zions First National Bank

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *

PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an
Arizona resident, et al.,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

Case No. 20807

vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
N.A., et al.,
District Court No. C-82-2779
Defendants,
Counterclaimants, and
Respondents.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
N.A., et al.,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
STEWART A. PEPPER, a Nevada
resident, et al. ,
Third-Party Defendants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
BIELE, HASLEM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
GARY R. HOWE (A1552)
CHARLES M, BENNETT (A0283)
SHERYL L. SIMPSON (A4670)
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorneys for Respondent
Zions First National Bank

LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Plaintiffs:

PHILLIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona
resident;
FRANCES T. MORGAN, an Illinois
resident; and
PHILLLIP C. PEPPER, as Conservator
of the Estate and Person of Fannie
N. Pepper.

Defendants:

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.;
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
as personal representative of the
Estate of Jerome B. Pepper;
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
as the trustee of the Jerome B.
Pepper Irrevocable Trust;
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
as the trustee of the Fannie N.
pepper Intervivos Trust.

Third-Party Plaintiffs:

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.;
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
as personal representative of the
Estate of Jerome B. Pepper;
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
as the trustee of the Jerome B.
Pepper Irrevocable Trust;
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A.,
as the trustee of the Fannie N.
Pepper Intervivos Trust.

Third-Party Defendants:

STEWART A. PEPPER, a Nevada
resident;
WILLIAM RONALD PEPPER, a Wyoming
resident;
FRED M. ROSENTHAL, an Arizona
resident;
CHARLES H. FOOTE, a Utah resident;
FRANK C. NIELSON,
J. WILL LEWIS,
RAY 0. WESTERGARD,
ROGER BROWN and
PHILLIP E. OSBORNE
d/b/a FOX & COMPANY; and
RICHARD S. HICKOK and
CHARLES E. JOHNSON
d/b/a MAIN HURDMAN.
(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(iv)

STATE OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATUTES, RULES, ETC

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

8

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE FINAL ORDER IS RES JUDICATA AS TO ALL
CLAIMS AGAINST ZIONS FOR ALL OF ITS ACTIONS
OR OMISSIONS AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE,
INCLUDING FRAUD, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE
OCTOBER 8, 1981 ORDER IS VACATED IN WHOLE OR
IN PART
A.

Utah Law Permits a Personal Representative's
Accounting to be Challenged on the Basis of
Fraud, Provided the Allegations Attack the
Final Order Itself, and Correspondingly Seek
to Have it Vacated

10

11

B.

The Utah Uniform Probate Code Adopts the PreUniform Probate Code Principles
13

C.

The Peppers' Choice Not to Attack the October
8, 1981 Order Precludes Their Relief from Such
Order
14

II. ZIONS, IN ITS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER
INTER VIVOS TRUST, IS PROTECTED FROM ANY FURTHER CLAIM
OF RES JUDICATA
15
A.

Even Under the Peppers' Analysis, the Doctrine of Res
Judicata Applies to This Appeal
17
(ii)

p
B.

Even if Zions, Acting as Trustee, Had Not Been a
Petitioner, Policy Considerations Support the
Position That the October 8, 1981 Order Precludes
Any Action by Plaintiffs Against Zions in Its
Capacity as Trustee

CONCLUSION

20
23

ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A-l

Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-106

25

EXHIBIT A-2

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1001

26

EXHIBIT A-3

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306

27

EXHIBIT A-4

Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civil Proc. . . .

28

EXHIBIT A-5

October 8, 1981 Order Approving
First and Final Accounting;
Approving Final Settlement and
Distribution; and Ratifying and
Approving Acts Including Sale of
Interest in Business

29

Order of Partial Summary Judgment,
dated July 5, 1985

34

EXHIBIT A-6

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
Auerbach v. Samuel, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d
1112 (1960)

12

Bernard v. Atlebury, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981) . . . .
In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 158
P. 705 (1916)
In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah 428, 182
P.2d 111 (1947) .
International Resources v. Dunfield, 599
P.2d 515 (Utah 1979)
Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287 (Utah 1980) . .
Miller v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 17 Utah
2d 88, 404 P.2d 675 (1965)

11
11, 12,
14
12
11
6, 7,
10,11
12

Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669
P.2d 873 (Utah 1983)

17

Pike v. Markham, 633 P.2d 944 (Wyo. 1981)
Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, Probate No. 62746
(3d D.C., Salt Lake County)
Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, 16 Utah App. Rptr. 8
(1985)

21
3, 9
5, 6,
7, 9,
19

STATUTES
Uniform Probate Code § 1-106

.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-106 (1975)
(iv)

14
2, 13
25

Page
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1001 (1975)

2, 13,
14, 26

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306(l)-(6) (1977)

2, 15,
27

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306(5) (1978)

2, 15,
27

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306(6) (1978)

2, 9,
15, 16,
17, 18,
23, 27

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)

2,6,
10, 28

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)(7)

....

4, 28

Other Authorities
6 A.L.R. Blue Book of Supplemental
Decisions 464 (1984)

21

Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1290 (1938)

21

(v)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the District Court properly dismissed the

Peppers1 allegations against Zions as personal representative
and as trustee where:

(a) the Peppers alleged Zions' conduct

constitutes fraud; (b) Zions' alleged misconduct came within
the parameters of the October 8, 1981 Order; and (c) the
Peppers purposely decided not to ask the District Court to
vacate the October 8, 1981 Order either in whole or in part.

2.

Whether the District Court properly dismissed the

Peppers' allegations against Zions as trustee where:

(a)

Peppers' allegations against Zions as trustee are grounded on
Zions' alleged misconduct as personal representative; (b) the
Probate Court entered the October 8, 1981 Order approving
Zions' acts as personal representative and consequentially
discharged Zions from further claim or liability for its duties
as personal representative; (c) Zions, acting as trustee,
specifically petitioned the Probate Court to enter the October
8, 1981 Order; and (d) the Peppers received notice of Zions'
petition as trustee but failed to object to the granting of
that petition.
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STATUTES, RULES, ETC.

This Appeal in part addresses the trial court's application
of relevant provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, found in
Title 75 of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

The following

sections of the Code are thought to be determinative, and for
reasons of length are reproduced in the Addendum to this Brief
as Exhibits A-l through A-3:

Utah Code Ann. §§
75-7-306 (1977).

75-1-106 (1975), 75-3-1001 (1975)

In addition, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is relevant to these proceedings and is reproduced in
the Addendum to this Brief as Exhibit A-4.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Peppers misstated important facts in their brief
submitted in this appeal, which are necessary for a proper
determination of both issues in this case.

Accordingly, Zions

hereby intends to supplement those facts stated in Appellants*
Statement of Facts.
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As to the first issue, the Peppers omitted the important
fact that Phillip C. Pepper and Frances Morgan (the
"Petitioners") filed a related motion in the original probate
proceeding seeking to have the Probate Court's Order of October
8, 1981 (the "October 8, 1981 Order"), a copy of which is
attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit A-5, vacated under
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Estate of

Jerome B. Pepper, Probate No. 62746 (3d D.C., Salt Lake County,
August 31, 1982).

(R. 1150).

The failure to disclose this

fact in their Statement of Facts led the Peppers to
mischaracterize the first issue in this appeal.
Appellant at 1.

Brief of

Accordingly, a full discussion of the Probate

Court proceeding and its relationship to this appeal is
necessary for a proper evaluation of the facts and precedent
pertinent to this appeal.

Peppers' Complaint Against Zions

This case began on April 6, 1982 when the Peppers filed
their original Complaint against Zions.

(R. 2). The First

Cause of Action asserted in that Complaint alleged misfeasance
on the part of Zions as personal representative of the estate
of Jerome B. Pepper.

The Peppers sought compensatory and
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punitive damages in the amount of $5,000,000 for this first
claim.

(R. 12-17, 20-21).

Zions* Motion to Dismiss

Prior to filing its Answer, Zions moved the District Court
to dismiss the First Cause of Action of the basis that the
October 8, 1981 Order was res judicata on the question of any
misfeasance on the part of Zions as personal representative of
the estate.

(R. 38-39).

The District Court granted Zions1

Motion with leave to the Peppers to amend their Complaint to
allege that Zions had committed fraud.

(R. 64-66).

The Peppers Chose to Pursue Two Separate Courses of Action

On July 1, 1982, prior to filing their First Amended
Complaint, the Petitioners filed a Verified Petition in the
original probate proceeding requesting that the Probate Court
vacate the October 8, 1981 Order under U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(7).
(R. 1150).

The following day, the Peppers filed their First

Amended Complaint, which contained the same factual allegations
described in the original Complaint.

- 4 -

(R. 69). In addition,

the Peppers alleged that Zions misrepresented facts to the
Peppers, facts upon which the Peppers detrimentally relied.
(R. 80).

It is critical to note that the prayer for relief in the
First Amended Complaint failed to include a request that the
District Court vacate the October 8, 1981 Order in whole or in
part.

(R. 87-88).

As shown by the discussion below, this

omission was an intentional decision by the Peppers not to
attempt to have the Order vacated.

The Probate Court Rules on the Verified Petition

On August 31, 1982, after due consideration, the Probate
Court ruled that the October 8, 1981 Order should not be
vacated; accordingly, the Court dismissed with prejudice the
Verified Petition.

The Petitioners then appealed the Probate

Court's decision to the Utah Supreme Court.
B. Pepper, 16 Utah App. Rptr. 8 (1985).

Estate of Jerome

(R. 1150).

Zions Argues the Mendenhall Decision in Defense of
the Probate Court's Decision
On appeal, Zions raised a number of arguments in support of
the Probate Court's decision.

One argument was based on the
- 5 -

1980 decision by this Court in Mendenhall v. Kingston/ 610 P„
2d 1287 (Utah 1980).

(R. 1151).

In Mendenhall, the Court held

that under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an
aggrieved party may attack an adverse order in either of two
ways:

(1) a party may move to vacate the Order granted in the

original proceeding pursuant to Rule 60(b); or (2) a party may
collaterally attack the Order in an independent action.

The

Mendenhall Court explicitly held that a party may not do both.
Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d at 1289.

Petitioner's Response

In response, Petitioner's stated:

There is no dispute that Zions has cited the
proper authority and the proper law on the
matter. However, no independent action has
been filed by the Peppers to vacate the
order which was entered by the Probate
Court. While it is true that there is
another action pending by Peppers against
Zions, that action is not to obtain vacation
of the October 8, 1981 Order. Reply Brief
of Appellants, Estate of Jerome B. Pepper,
16 Utah App. Rptr. 8 (1985). (R. 1151).
Thus, the Peppers have intentionally chosen not to attack
the October 8, 1981 Order in this proceeding so that they might
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preserve the possibility of success on their Rule 60(b) Motion
in the original probate proceeding.

Supreme Court Decision on Rule 60(b) Appeal

After full briefing and oral argument, the Supreme Court
rendered a decision on August 5, 1985 which affirmed the
Probate Court's decision.
App. Rptr. 8 (1985).

Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, 16 Utah

As a result of the Petitioner's

representation quoted above, the Mendenhall decision was not a
basis for the Supreme Court's affirmance.

Estate of Jerome B.

Pepper, 16 Utah App. Rptr. 8 (1985).

The second issue in this appeal concerns the effect of the
October 8, 1981 Order on the Peppers' allegations of
misfeasance by Zions acting as trustee of the Jerome B. Pepper
Estate.

The Peppers' Statement of Facts attempts to minimize

Zions' participation as trustee in securing that Order.
However, the record reflects that Zions petitioned the Probate
Court in its capacity as both personal representative and
trustee.

The Petition requested that the Probate Court:

1.

Approve the final accounting submitted
by Zions acting as personal
representative;
- 7 -

2.

Approve the sale of assets to Hugo Neu
consummated by Zions while acting as
trustee;

3.

Approve the proposed transfer of assets
and liabilities from the personal
representative to the trustee;

4.

Authorize the trustee to accept the
transfer of assets and liabilities, to
pay certain liabilities of the estate,
and to administer the assets and
liabilities so transferred in
accordance with the Trust Agreement; and

5.

Discharge the personal representative
from further claim or liability from
any interested party and close the
estate, (R. 1316-17).

The importance of Zions' role as trustee in obtaining the
October 8, 1981 Order is discussed in full in Point II below.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The District Court properly dismissed Appellants'
allegations against Zions, acting as both personal
representative and trustee for the Jerome B. Pepper Estatec
The October 8, 1981 Final Settlement Order is conclusive as to
all claims against Zions as personal representative, whether
grounded in negligence, fraud, or otherwise, unless the Peppers
seek to have the October 8, 1981 Order vacated in whole or in
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part.

In order to protect their related action to vacate the

October 8, 1981 Order in the original probate proceeding
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, Probate No. 62746 (3d D.C., Salt
Lake County); aff'd, 16 Utah App. Rptr. 8 (1985), the Peppers
have elected not to seek to vacate the October 8, 1981 Order in
this proceeding.

Thus, the October 8, 1981 Order will not be

set aside and the Peppers are precluded from any recovery
against Zions, acting as personal representative, as a result
of Zions1 discharge under the October 8, 1981 Order.

Under Utah law, Zions, acting as trustee, should not be
held liable for breaching its duties for failure to correct the
personal representative's alleged mistakes, where the personal
representative's actions have been approved in a final order
pursuant to the petition of the trustee.
§ 75-7-306(6) (1978).

Utah Code Ann.

Moreover, policy considerations support

the conclusion that even if Zions had not petitioned as trustee
for the October 8, 1981 Order, the Court should hold the
October 8, 1981 Order conclusive as to the trustee's liability
under Utah Code Ann.

§ 75-7-306(6) (1978), in that the October

8, 1981 Order determined that Zions, acting as the personal
representative, did not breach its duty to the Peppers.
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ARGUMENTS

POINT I.
THE FINAL ORDER IS RES JUDICATA AS TO ALL CLAIMS AGAINST
ZIONS FOR ALL OF ITS ACTIONS OR OMISSIONS AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE, INCLUDING FRAUD, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
THE OCTOBER 8, 1981 ORDER IS VACATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART.
The issue before the Court is whether the Peppers can sue
Zions for its alleged fraudulent misconduct in its
administration of the Jerome B. Pepper Estate in light of the
Peppers' purposeful decision not to ask the District Court to
vacate the October 8, 1981 Order.

The Peppers have

misconstrued the District Court's decision and its
application.

The District Court's decision does not "permit a

personal representative to defraud the estate with impunity."
Brief of Appellants at 7-8.

Rather, the District Court's Order

correctly recognizes that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provide an aggrieved party with two choices in seeking redress
from a Final Order.

A party may either seek to vacate the

Final Order in the original probate proceeding pursuant to Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b), or attack the Final Order
collaterally through an independent action pursuant to Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b).

A party may not do both.

Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah 1980).
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Because the Peppers purposely chose not to seek the
vacation of the October 8, 1981 Order in this action, the
Mendenhall decision supports the District Court's conclusion
that the October 8, 1981 Order was res judicata as to all of
Peppers' claims against Zions, in its capacity
representative of the Pepper Estate.

as personal

Bernard v. Atlebury, 629

P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1981); International Resources v. Dunfield,
599 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979).

This holding of the District

Court is much narrower in scope than that set forth in the
Peppers' brief.

A.

Utah Law Permits a Personal Representative's
Accounting to be Challenged on the Basis of Fraud,
Provided the Allegations Attack the Final Order Itself
and Correspondingly Seek to Have it Vacated.

Prior to the adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, a
number of Utah cases considered the issue of how pervasive an
Order settling an executor's account ought to be.

For example,

the court in In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 158 P. 705
(1916), stated:

It is apparent, therefore, that an
executor's or administrator's account which
has been allowed can be assailed only in
equity and upon the same grounds as other
judgments. Moreover, such attacks cannot be
made, as they were attempted to be made in
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this proceeding, by a mere reference to some
items in the objections filed to the
allowance of the final account, but the
attack must be made as in other cases where
a judgment is assailed for fraud, etc.
(Emphasis added.)
In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah at 132, 158 P. at 709.

Accord,

Miller v. Walker Bank Sc Trust Co., 17 Utah 2d 88, 404 P.2d 675,
(1965); In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah 428, 182 P.2d 111, (1947).

In Auerbach v. Samuel, 10 Utah 2d 152, 154 349 P.2d, 112,
114 (1960), the Court observed that:

The difficulty confronting plaintiffs is the
binding effect with which such orders and
decrees are endowed. At this late date they
could pierce the protective armor of the
decrees referred to above and successfully
assert an interest in the estate only by
showing that they have been victims of
fraud; and this would have to be a kind
known as extrinsic fraud.
Extrinsic fraud is to be distinguished
from the ordinary garden variety of fraud.
The latter . . . is that which occurs within
the framework of the actual conduct at the
trial, . . . .
The responsibility rests
upon those conducting the trial to expose
and deal with any such deception . . . .
On the other hand, extrinsic fraud,
with which we are here concerned, is of a
different character. It is sometimes
referred to as collateral fraud because it
is the type of fraud which would justify
setting aside a decree or judgment on
collateral attack. (Emphasis added.)
- 12 -

In summary, under pre-Utah Uniform Probate Code law
discussed above, one can conclude that if a party wished to
question a fiduciary's actions after court approval a Final
Order, that party was required to attack the Order of
approval.

Without such an attack, the doctrine of res judicata

would act as an absolute bar to any proceeding against the
fiduciary.

B.

The Utah Uniform Probate Code Adopts the Pre-Uniform
Probate Code Principles.

The principle that a party must attack a Final Order in
order to challenge a fiduciary's actions was incorporated into
the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1001 sets

forth the general rule that a Final Order will Mdischarg[e] the
personal representative from further claim or demand of any
interested person."

Notwithstanding this rule, the Utah

Uniform Probate Code does provide for relief from a Final Order
if such Order was procured by fraud.
§ 75-1-106.

Utah Code Ann.

The Editorial Board Comments to section 75-1-106

provide that the party asserting fraud must necessarily attack
the Final Order and have it annulled or vacated in order to
challenge the personal representative in regards to his
fraudulent acts.

These Comments, in pertinent part, provide:

- 13 -

Any action under this Section is subject to
usual rules of res judicata; thus, if a
forged will has been informally probated, an
heir discovers the forgery, and then there
is a formal proceeding under Section
75-3-1001 of which the heir is given notice,
followed by an order of complete settlement
of the estate, the heir could not bring a
subsequent action under this section but
would be bound by the litigation in which
the issue could have been raised.
The usual rules for securing relief for
fraud on a court would govern, however.
(Emphasis added.)
Editorial Board Comments, Uniform Probate Code § 1-106.

The

usual relief given an aggrieved party in this situation is to
vacate the Order obtained by fraudc

In re Raleigh's Estate, 48

Utah at 132, 158 P. at 709

C.

The Peppers' Choice Not to Attack the October 8, 1981
Order Precludes Their Relief From Such Order.

The Peppers may not proceed against Zions in its capacity
as personal representative of the Jerome B. Pepper Estate on
any legal theory unless they also attack the October 8, 1981
Order.

That Order must be set aside in whole or in part before

the Peppers are open to any recovery.

Because the Peppers have

elected not to attack the October 8, 1981 Order in this
proceeding, they cannot recover on any claims against Zions
which fall within the ambit of the October 8, 1981 Order.
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Accordingly, Peppers1 claims which fell within the ambit of the
October 8, 1981 Order v*ere properly dismissed with prejudice.

POINT II.
ZIONS, IN ITS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE JEROME B.
PEPPER INTER V[VOS TRUST, IS PROTECTED FROM ANY
FURTHER CLAIM OF THE PEPPERS BY THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
Under Utah law, a trustee is granted statutory protection
from any breach of fiduciary duty by a predecessor fiduciary:

In the absence of actual knowledge or
information which would cause a reasonable
trustee to inquire further, no trustee shall
be liable for failure to take necessary
steps to compel the redress of any breach of
trust or fiduciary duty by any predecessor
personal representative, trustee, or other
fiduciary. Ths provisions of this section
[§ 75-7-3Q6(l)-(6)] shall not be construed
to limit the fiduciary liability of any
trustee for his own acts or omissions with
respect to the trust estate.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-336(6).

When this subsection is viewed

as it relates to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306(5), neither of which
are part of the Uniform Probate Code, it is clear that the Utah
Legislature intended for trustees to be responsible for their
own actions, and not for those of predecessor fiduciaries.
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It

then follows that in order to overcome the statutory protection
afforded trustees, a complaining party must aLlege and prove:

1.
The predecessor fiduciary breached the
predecessor's duty to the complaining party;
and
2.
The current trustee had actual
knowledge or information of the breach.
In the present case, Zions, acting as trustee, petitioned
the Probate Court for an Order discharging Zions as personal
representative for the Jerome B. Pepper Estate.

(R. 1313-18).

Pursuant to that petition, the Probate Court entered its Order
determining that the personal representative had not breached
any duties to the Peppers.

(R. 1322-28).

This ruling is

conclusive under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306(6), for purposes of
determining whether there was any breach of duty by Zions
committed while it was acting as personal representative.

In

light of the fact that the very issue the Peppers have raised
against Zions as trustee has been decided in a Final Order
pursuant to a petition filed by Zions, acting as trustee, the
Peppers cannot prove that the predecessor fiduciary breached
its duty unless that Final Order is vacated in whole or in
part.

It must once again be emphasized that the Peppers have

elected not to seek to vacate the October 8, 1981 Order in this
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proceeding.

It then follows that the October 8, 1981 Order is

res judicata as to the Peppers' claims against Zions, acting in
its capacity as trustee.

A.

Even Under Peppers' Analysis, the Doctrine of Res
Judicata Applies to This Appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court case of Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme,
Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983) provides the rule that

. . . [C]laim preclusion bars the
relitigation by the parties or their privies
of a claim for relief that was once
litigated on the merits and resulted in a
final judgment between the same parties or
their privies . . . .
The same rule also
prevents relitigation of claims that could
and should have been litigated in the prior
action but were not. (Citations omitted.)
Because the October 8, 1981 Order approved both the personal
representative's final accounting and the acceptance of assets
and liabilities by the trustee, and because the trustee
specifically petitioned the Probate Court for this Order, Zions
believes that the October 8, 1981 Order specifically
adjudicated the Peppers' claims against Zions, acting as
Trustee.

See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306(6) (1978).

Even if

this Court determined that the Order did not specifically
adjudicate such claims against Zions, acting as trustee, any
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claims the Peppers assert against Zions "could and should" have
been set forth at the time Zions' petition was heard on October
7, 1981,

(R, 1319).

It is improper to raise these issues for

the first time in these proceedings.

In recognition of the fact that claim preclusion bars
claims that "could and should" have been presented, the Peppers
argue that their claims against Zions in its capacity as
trustee did not mature until the October 8, 1981 Order was
entered.

Appellant's Brief at 15, The Peppers are mistaken.

If one assumes, for purposes of this appeal, that Zions
acting as trustee, is charged with the same knowledge as Zions,
in its capacity as personal representative, it then follows
that the Peppers* claims against Zions, acting as trustee,
would accrue as each alleged breach by Zions, acting as
personal representative, occurred, as where Zions, acting as
trustee, allegedly failed to take any steps to seek redress for
the alleged improper acts of the personal representative.
Code Ann. § 75-7-306(6) (1978).

Utah

Moreover, when Zions, in its

capacity as trustee, filed its petition on September 23, 1981
seeking court approval of Zions1 final account as personal
representative, the trustee indicated full approval of the
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final accounting prepared by the personal representative.

When

notice of this petition was sent to the Peppers (R. 1319-20),
Zions, acting as trustee, placed the Peppers on notice that the
trustee approved of Zions' acts as personal representative and
that the trustee was seeking judicial protection from further
liability in its act of filing such accounting and petition for
approval.

The hearing on Zions' petition was the appropriate

forum for the Peppers to appear and object to Zions' actions;
nevertheless, the Peppers chose not to take such action.

See

Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, 16 Utah App. Rptr. 8, 10 (1985).
The logical reaction to such inaction compels the conclusion
that the Peppers' claims "could and should" have been asserted
when the October 7, 1981 hearing was held, and that the
Peppers' failure to assert those claims at that time bars
litigation of them in this proceeding.

Thus, based on the Peppers' own analysis of the
applicability of the doctrine of res judicata (claim
preclusion), the Peppers' claims against Zions in its capacity
as trustee are precluded pursuant to the October 8, 1981 Order.
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B.

Even if Zions, acting as Trustee, Had Not Been a
Petitioner, Policy Considerations Support the Position
That the October 8, 1981 Order Precludes Any Action by
Plaintiffs Against Zions, in Its Capacity as Trustee,

The Peppers cite cases from four non Uniform Probate Code
jurisdictions in support of their arguments which hold that the
discharge of a personal representative will not bar subsequent
claims against a trustee who is a beneficiary of the estate for
the acts or omissions of that personal representative.

These

cases are distinguishable from the present case in that they
consider situations in which the trustee did not join in the
petition seeking approval of the personal representative's
final accounting with corresponding discharge of the personal
representative from further liability.

Had these courts been

faced with the facts of this appeal, where the trustee
petitioned for approval of the Final Order, it is likely that
each case would have held the trustee entitled to the
protection of the Order for which it had sought approval.

Even if Zions, acting as trustee, had not been a party to
the petition for approval of the personal representative's
final accounting, it does not necessarily follow that this
Court should adopt the rule established in the four
jurisdictions cited by the Peppers.

- 20 -

Six jurisdictions,

including California, have held conversely to the premise
presented by Appellants.

These jurisdictions hold that the

approval of a personal representative's final accounting
protects the trustee from any further claims of interested
persons.

Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1290 (1938).

The most recent of

these cases, which supports the position contrary to that
presented by Appellants, is Pike v. Markham, 633 P.2d 944 (Wyo.
1981) (cited in 6 A.L.R. Blue Book of Supplemental Decisions
464 (1984).

Because of this split in authority, it is

appropriate for this Court to look beyond the decisions cited
in Appellant's brief and consider instead those policies which
should control this issue and which should consequentially be
adopted in this state.

Zions proposes that the most important policy issues to be
addressed in determining whether to adopt the rule espoused by
the Peppers, that approval of a personal representative's final
accounting should not also protect the trustee, is whether such
a rule would both (1) protect trust beneficiaries and (2) not
make unfair distinctions between different classes of trustees.

The rule proposed by the Peppers is likely to harm
beneficiaries and unfairly distinguish between different
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classes of trustees.

Given such a rule, logically follows that

the duty to be imposed on trustees can be circumvented in
either of two ways:

(2) the trustee can, as here, join in the

petition seeking the approval of the personal representative's
accounting; and (2) the trustee can insist on exculpatory
language for its own protection in the trust agreement itself.
For example, the trust could provide:

Each trustee shall be exempt from any
liability in any way related to the prior
actions or omissions of any prior
fiduciaries and each is specifically hereby
relieved of any duty to examine or review
the actions of prior fiduciaries.
If the rule urged by the plaintiffs were adopted in Utah,
the liability of trustees in such situations would become a
trap for the unwary.

Corporate fiduciaries, familiar with the

ruling and its implications, would use either or both of the
means suggested above to avoid liability.

Individual trustees,

however, not being as versed in the technical aspects of the
law, might not be aware of the rule and its implications, and
could be caught.

To avoid this undesireable consequence,

policy should compel the conclusion that the Peppers and other
similarly-situated trust beneficiaries be limited to their
remedy in original probate proceedings, that proceeding most
logical for prosecuting their objections.
- 22 -

CONCLUSION

The District Court correctly ruled in the July 5, 1985
Order of Partial Summary Judgment, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit A-6 in the Addendum, that in view of The
Peppers' decision not to seek to vacate the October 8, 1981
Order, that Order is res judicata as to all of the Peppers1
claims against Zions in its capacity as personal
representative.

The District Court also correctly ruled that

since Zions, acting as trustee, petitioned the Court for entry
of the October 8, 1981 Order, Zions was entitled to rely upon
that Order for protection from the Peppers1 claims against the
trustee, under Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306 (6) (1978).

In light of these arguments and corresponding authority,
Zions respectfully requests that the Supreme Court affirm the
District Court's decision on both issues presented in this
appeal.

In addition, Zions requests that it be awarded its

costs incurred in pursuing this action.
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DATED:

January

SL.

1986

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
GARY R. HOWE
CHARLES M. BENNETT
SHERYL L. SIMPSON

By
Sheryl (LI. Simpsoi
Attorneys for Defendant
Respondent Zions First
National Bank
CDN1810S
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit A-l
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-106.

Effect of Fraud and evasion.

Whenever fraud has been perpetrated in connection with any
proceeding or in any statement filed under this code or if
fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes
of this code, any person injured thereby may obtain appropriate
relief against the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution from
any person (other than a bona fide purchaser) benefitting from
the fraud, whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must be
commenced within three years after the discovery of the fraud,
but no proceeding may be brought against one not a perpetrator
of the fraud later than five years after the time of commission
of the fraud. This section has no bearing on remedies relating
to fraud practiced on a decedent during his lifetime which
affects the succession of his estate.
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Exhibit A-2
Utah Code Ann,§ 75-3-1001. Formal proceedings terminating
administration - Testate or intestate - Order of general
protection.
(1) A personal representative or any interested person may
petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate.
The personal representative may petition at any time, and any
other interested person may petition after one year from the
appointment of the original personal representative except that
no petition under this section may be entertained until the
time for presenting claims which arose prior to the death of
the decedent has expired. The petition may request the court
to determine testacy, if not previously determined, to consider
the final account or compel or approve an accounting and
distribution, to construe any will or determine heirs, and to
adjudicate the final settlement and distribution of the
estate. After notice to all interested persons and hearing
the court may enter an order or orders, on appropriate
conditions, determining the persons entitled to distribution of
the estate, and, as circumstances require, approving settlement
and directing or approving distribution of the estate and
discharging the personal representative from further claim or
demand of any interested person.
(2) If one or more heirs or devisees were omitted as
parties in, or were not given notice of, a previous formal
testacy proceeding, the court, on proper petition for an order
of complete settlement of the estate under this section, and
after notice to the omitted or unnotified persons and other
interested parties determined to be interested on the
assumption that the previous order concerning testacy is
conclusive as to those given notice of the earlier proceeding,
may determine testacy as it affects the omitted persons and
confirm or alter the previous order of testacy as it affects
all interested persons as appropriate in the light of the new
proofs. In the absence of objection by an omitted or
unnotified person, evidence received in the original testacy
proceeding shall constitute prima facie proof of due execution
of any will previously admitted to probate, or of the fact that
the decedent left no valid will if the prior proceedings
determined this fact.
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Exhibit A-3
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306.
third parties.

Personal liability of trustee to

(1) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee
is not personally liable on contracts properly entered into in
his fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the
trust estate unless he fails to reveal his representative
capacity and identify the trust estate in the contract.
(2) A trustee is personally liable for obligations arising
from ownership or control of property of the trust estate or
for torts committed in the course of administration of the
trust estate only if he is personally at fault.
(3) Claims based on contracts entered into by a trustee in
his fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising from ownership
or control of the trust estate, or on torts committed in the
course of trust administration may be asserted against the
trust estate by proceeding against the trustee in his fiduciary
capacity, whether or not the trustee is personally liable
therefor.
(4) The question of liability as between the trust estate
and the trustee individually may be determined in a proceeding
for accounting, surcharge or indemnification or other
appropriate proceeding.
(5) Whenever an instrument creating a trust reserves to
the settlor, or vests in an advisory or investment committee,
or in any other person or persons, including one or more
co-trustees to the exclusion of the trustee or to the exclusion
of one or more of several trustees, authority to direct the
making or retention of any investment, the excluded trustee or
trustees shall not be liable, either individually or as a
fiduciary, for any loss resulting from the making or retention
of any investment pursuant to such direction.
(6) In the absence of actual knowledge or information
which would cause a reasonable trustee to inquire further, no
trustee shall be liable for failure to take necessary steps to
compel the redress of any breach of trust or fiduciary duty by
any predecessor personal representative, trustee, or other
fiduciary. The provisions of this section shall not be
construed to limit the fiduciary liability of any trustee for
his own acts or omissions with respect to the trust estate.
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Exhibit A-4
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60.
Order.

Relief From Judgment or

(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has
not been personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said
action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
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MARRVEL E. HALL of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys foi Er.atc of Jerome 3. Fepper, Deceased
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-1500
lis7 THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

^
\0
_r<V
1*t.^\

In the matter of the Estate of

ORDER APPROVING FIRST AND
FINAL ACCOUNT, APPROVING
FINAL SETTLEMENT AND
DISTRIBUTION; AND RATIFYING AND APPROVING
ACTS INCLUDING SALE OF
INTEREST IN BUSINESS,

JEROME B. PEPPER,
Deceased,

IB

Probate No. 62746

The petition of Zions First National Bank for approval of
First and Final Account for final settlement and distribution; for
ratification and approval of acts including sale of interest in
business, coming on regularly to be heard, it appearing to the
Court that due and legal notice has been given to all interested
parties as required by law, and no person appearing in opposition
thereto, the Court finds:
1.

The above named decedent died on January 13, 1976, a

resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and thereafter
petitioner was duly appointed and is now the qualified and acting
Personal Representative of the estate of said decedent.
2.

Petitioner, as the personal representative of the

decedent, has collected and managed the assets of the estate; has
filed an inventory herein; has published notice to creditors; has
paid all lawful claims of the decedent's creditors against the
estate except for two claims as explained in paragraph 3 below;
has elected to pay a portion the federal estate tax determined to
be owed by the estate in the amount of $283,891.40 in installments
(of which $91,658.00 remains unpaid); has obtained consent of the

29 RAY. QUINNFY tr MCHEKhR

State Tax Commission to pay a portion of the Utah Inheritance Tax
of $157,830.00 in installments over a five-year period (of which
$46,698.00 remains unpaid); and has performed all acts required of
a Personal Representative by the laws of this state pertaining to
estates of decedents.
3.

The time for presenting claims which arose prior to

the death of the decedent has expired, all claims except for a
pledge to Congregation Kol Ami, (which petitioner has arranged to
pay in installments) and a claim of Peppers Allied Metals Company
which will be settled in the course of liquidation of the latter
corporation, have been paid; and there are no contingent, unliquidated or future claims against the estate.

There is no necessity

to further delay distribution of the estate until the remaining
claims, Utah inheritance tax and Federal Estate Tax have been paid
in full.

The assets remaining in the estate are not sufficient to

pay said remaining obligations in any event.

The petitioner, in

its capacity as Trustee under a trust agreement entered into with
the decedent, Jerome B. Pepper, on April 15, 1975 (during his
lifetime), is the sole devisee and beneficiary of all of the
rest, residue and remainder of the estate properties.

The

remaining death tax and pledge installment obligations should be
paid by Petitioner out of trusts created under said agreement.
Petitioner, as such Trustee, therefore, hereby assumes said
obligations of the estate.

The $427,036.34 open account balance

owed to Peppers Allied Metals Company (a corporation controlled by
the estate, which is presently in liquidation) is partially offset
by a payable from said corporation to the trust as set forth in
paragraph 8 below.
4c

Petitioner has filed its first and final accounting

of its administration of this estate.

Said accounting, consisting

of a summary and schedules 1 through 11C, is attached to the
petition as Exhibit A and by reference made a part hereof.

- 30 -2-

5.

As shown on schedules 7A and 8 of said accounting, on

the 18th day of May, 1981, petitioner, in its capacity as Personal
Representative, distributed to itself, in its capacity as Trustee
under said agreement dated April 15, 1975 the decedent's interest
as a co-venturer in the Learner-Pepper Company.
6.

On the 28th day of May, 1981, Petitioner, in its

capacity as such Trustee, entered into an agreement, as Seller,
with Hugo Neu Steel Products, Inc., a Massachusetts Corporation,
as Buyer, for sale to the Buyer of decedentfs interest in the
Learner-Pepper Company for $1,000,000.

The sale price is subject

to adjustment to reflect additional facts, if any, disclosed by an
audit of the books of Learner-Pepper Company pursuant to the Joint
Venture Purchase Agreement executed by the parties to said sale, a
copy of which is attached to the petition as Exhibit B and by
reference made a part thereof.

All adult beneficiaries of said

trust consented in writing to said sale.

Copies of their consents

are attached to the petition as Exhibits C-l through C-5 inclusive
and are by reference made a part thereof.
7.

On the 22nd day of April, 1981, Petitioner, in its

capacity as Personal Representative, on behalf of the Estate as
controlling shareholder of Peppers Allied Metals Company, a Utah
Corporation, together with the other shareholders, caused said
company to adopt a plan of liquidation, a copy of which is
attached to the petition as Exhibit D and by reference made a part
thereof.

In accordance with said plan of liquidation and under

Petitioner's direction, the officers of Pepper Allied Metals
Company, on May 23, 1981, caused that company, as Seller, to sell
to Hugo Neu Steel Products, Inc., as Buyer, all of the fixed
assets of its Ogcen, Utah, scrap metals recycling operation for
$88,352.00, pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement, a copy of
which is attached to the petition as Exhibit E and by reference
made a part thereof,
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3.

In connection with the sale transactions described in

Paragraphs 6 and 7 above, Petitioner, in its capacity as Trustee,
«=** a Portion of the- proceeds of the sale of the Learner-Pepper
Company Joint Venture interest to purchase, from the Utah Copper
^vision, Kennecott Metals Company, a debt of Peppers Allied
Metals company

i n t h e amounfc Q f $ 2 2 5 / 0 1 9 > 3 5 /

and f r Q m

Teledyne

National, a debt of Peppers Allied Metals Company in the amount of
524,356.22.

Purchase of these obligations was required by Hugo

Neu steel Products, inc., the Buyer, as a condition to closing the
^ l e s transactions. Copies of two checks drawn by Petitioner on
said Trust account to the respective Assignors of said debts are
attached to the petition as Exhibit »F" which is by reference made
a

Part thereof.
9.

a

Petitioner's accounting should be approved, and

H of petitioner's acts in the administration of the estate,

including those described in paragraphs 5 and 7 above, should be
ratified and approved.
10.

Those acts of petitioner performed, in its capacity

as Trustee in its administration of said Trust, which are
Ascribed in paragraphs 6 and 8 above should be ratified and
a

PProved.

THEREFORE, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
a

T 1

b-

The acts of petitioner performed in
administering said trust which are described
herein be and are hereby ratified and approved.

*

i f f i n a l account of petitioner which is
attached to the petition, together with all
acts of petitioner in the administration of the
estate be and are hereby approved and ratified;
petitioner be and is hereby authorized and
directed to distribute and transfer title to
the assets of the estate to petitioner as
Trustee under said Trust Agreement dated April
15, 1975, to be held, administered and
distributed in accordance with the provisions
of said Trust Agreement, and, after petitioner
nas made such final settlement and distribution
and^has filed petitioner's receipts herein,
petitioner shall be discharged and the
administration of this estate closed.
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Petitioner as Trustee be and is hereby
authorized and directed to pay the remaining
pledge obligation, the Federal Estate Tax and
Utan Inneritance Tax obligations and any
remaining balance of the Peppers Allied Metals
Comp"a7iy open account not otherwise disposed of
in the course of liquidation of that corporation out: of the Trusts created under said Trust
Agreement dated April 15, 1975.
DATED this

ATTEST

y

day of

/ f ^ ^ / c , 1981.
BY THE COURT

s*Q)U

D i s t r i c t Judge

W. STERLING EVANS
Cferk
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CALLISTER & NEBEKER
GARY R. HOWE (A15 52)
CHARLES M. BENNETT (A0283)
JEFFREY L. SHIELDS (A2947)
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 531-7676
Attorneys for Defendant
Zions First National Bank
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT-OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

PHILIP C. PEPPER, an Arizona
resident, et al.,
Plaintiff.

ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
(Honorable James S. Sawaya)
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK.
N.A. et al. ,
Civil No. C-82-2779
Defendant

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK.
N.A. ,
Third Party Defendant.
vs.
STUART A. PEPPER, a Nevada
resident, et al..
Third Party Defendant,
* * * * * * *
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II
•I

The motion of Zions First National Bank ("Zions") for

i

|j Partial Judgment on the Pleadings or in the alternative, for
l|
llPartial Summary Judgment came before the Court, the Honorable

'I

. .

iJames S. Sawaya presiding, on the 6th day of May, 1985 at 2:00
11
• i

i| p.m.
Charles M. Bennett, Gary K. Howe and Jeffrey L. Shields,
I
iof and for Callister & Nebeker, appeared on behalf of
ii

' defendant, Zions First National Bank.

Edward S. Sweeney and J.

Peter Mulhern, of and for Biele, Haslam & Hatch, appeared on
|behalf of the plaintiffs, Phillip C. Pepper, guardian and
'conservator of Fannie N. Pepper, Phillip C. Pepper and Frances
,JT. Morgan.

H. Michael Keller, of and for VanCott, Bagley,

;'Cornwall & McCarthy, appeared on behalf of third party
!|defendants, Charles H. Foote and Fox & Co. Bernard L. Rose
ii
j!appeared on behalf of third party defendant, Fred M. Rosenthal.
11
11

•[
ij

The Court heard the argument of Mr. Bennett in favor of the

}|motion and the argument of Mr. Mulhern and Mr. Sweeney in
{'opposition to the motion.
! The Court also considered
| motion.

No other parties argued the motion.
the memoranda of counsel on the

Thus, having been fully advised in the premises, the

I Court entered

its minute entry of May 6th, 1985 granting Zions 1

[motion.

||
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Thereafter, Zions submitted a proposed order pursuant to
Rule 2o9 and plaintiffs filed their objection to the scope of
the proposed order.

Memoranda was submitted by plaintiffs and

Zions in support of their respective positions.

A hearing was

held on June 10, 1985 at 2:00 p.m. and the Court heard the
argument of counsel.

Thus, having been fully advised in the

matter, the Court finds and rules as follows:

1.

The plaintiffs have expressly chosen not to seek to

set aside or vacate the order of the Honorable G. Hal Taylor,
in Probate No. 62746, the Estate of Jerome B. Pepper, dated
October 8, 1981 (the "October 8, 1981 Order").

2.

Accordingly, the October 8, 1981 Order remains res

judicata as to all of plaintiffs1 claims against Zions First
National Bank which fall within the purview of the October 8,
1981 Order.

3.

All of the plaintiffs' claims in their first cause of

action (paragraphs 50 through 69 of the plaintiffs1. Second
Amended Complaint, dated December 7, 1982) fall within the
purview of the October 8, 1981 Order and should be dismissed.
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4.

All of the plaintiffs1 claims in their second cause of

action (paragraphs 70 through 86) fall within the purview of
the October 8, 1981 Order and should be dismissed.

5.

Paragraphs 106 through 108 of the plaintiffs1 fifth

cause of action fall within the purview of the October 8, 1981
Order and should be dismissed.

6.

Since there is not just reason for further delay and

since this Order constitutes a final order as to plaintiffs'
first and second causes of action (and related parts of
plaintiffs' fifth cause of action) it is proper for this Order
to issue pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b).

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered:

1.

All of plaintiffs' claims which fall within the

purview of the October 8, 1981 Order are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.

Those claims are encompassed in paragraphs 50

through 69, 70 through 86, 106 through 108 of the plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint, dated December 7, 1982.

- 37 - 4 -

2.

This Order shall constitute a final order pursuant to

U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b).

DATED:/'

985

By The Court: / '

Tjne' Honorable James S.Sawaya

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY

CN2289B

Clerk

-ry^^-f
y

-
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D<£gty Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

It is hereby certified by the undersigned that four (4)
copies of the foregoing

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ZIONS FIRST

NATIONAL BANK were served by mail, postage fully prepaid,
upon counsel as follows:

BIELE, HASLEM & HATCH
Attorneys for Appellants
50 West Broadway
4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

on this 15th day of January, 1986.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

